(译文)The Other Tibet


  1. 翻译本文不代表本人同意其观点,请带着批判的眼光看文章。
  2. 不对文字翻译的准确性负责。纯粹练手,限于水平和理解,必然存在大量错误。英文原文都有,请自行理解,硬说被误导的人我也没办法。
  3. 图床在picasa,不能翻墙的同学可以选择跳过本文或纯文字欣赏。
  4. 有任何问题请直接联系作者Matthew Teague,文章不是我写的。本人长期定居毛里求斯,请勿跨国追捕

article source:nationalgeographic
picture source:nationalgeographic

Facts can be so misleading, where rumors, true or false, are often revealing.
——《Inglourious Basterds》

Of course, I don’t totally believe the story  below, and it was written by a foreigner with his own point of view, which could be very subjective; but neither can I trust the government’s reports, because they covered up many details. As I think, if it is a rumor, we should stand out to expose the lie; if not, we certainly have the right to know the truth. So even rumors provide a perspective. The more we hear about them, the better we could know how to distinguish them.

I am merely an apprentice for translation, and I bring this article to you. Now it’s your turn to read and think it. Remember,

Think wrongly, if you please, but in all cases think for yourself.
——Doris Lessing

Last but not least I’d like to dedicate this work to yeeyan for it has once helped me a lot.


The Other Tibet

The Uygurs, Muslim people of China’s resource-rich far west, are becoming strangers in their own land as Han Chinese pour in. Like the Tibetans, who face similar pressures, some Uygurs see a chance for a better life, but others protest the disintegration of their culture, even at the risk of death.

作者:Matthew Teague
摄影:Carolyn Drake

A long journey ahead, Uygur villagers settle in for a night ride from Darya Boyi to market.

前路漫漫,维吾尔村民要在车里过上一夜才能从Darya Boyi到集市。

From National Geographic
Alone in a crowd, A Uygur woman (at right) shops at a Chinese market in Karamay, an oil-industry city dominated by Han. Although they make up nearly half of Xinjiang’s population, Uygurs hold few top jobs.


From National Geographic
Divided City
A window frame splits the view of Urumqi’s Noghay Mosque from Chinese-style development. In July, riots erupted here in Xinjiang’s capital, pitting Uygurs against Han Chinese.


From National Geographic
Documented on a bystander’s cell phone, a Uygur man lies in a street in Urumqi, shot by security forces after charging them with what appeared to be a sword.


From National Geographic

The first several seconds of the incident in Urumqi seemed almost lighthearted, considering the previous week. And they revealed nothing about what would follow. A cool front had swept over the city on this particular day in July, drawing people from their homes. Some shops stayed closed because their windows had been shattered, but food vendors pushed their carts out onto the street. A week earlier an ethnic clash had broken out here, killing almost 200 people in one of China’s most deadly protests since the Tiananmen Square massacre two decades ago. So the Chinese government had sent tens of thousands of security forces into the city, the capital of the Xinjiang Uygur Auton omous Region, to restore order between the Han and the Uygurs. The Han dominate Chinese society, but the Uygurs (pronounced WEE-gurs), a Turkic-speaking Central Asian people, claim this western borderland as their ancestral home.

Han security forces stood in ranks along every street in the city’s Uygur quarter. They bristled with riot gear and automatic weapons. The only sound came from loudspeakers mounted on trucks that trawled the market streets, broadcasting the good news of ethnic harmony. If Urumqi had an edge of unrest on this Monday, it was sheathed in silence.

Most Uygurs are Muslims, and about noon I stood on the street in front of a central mosque wondering how many people might be inside. As if in answer, a mass of humanity came pouring out, hundreds of people tumbling and plunging into the street.

Bystanders watched, puzzled, but the emerging crowd offered only odd and inscrutable clues: Many hadn’t had time to pull on their shoes and ran in just their socks. They cried out with alarm or possibly in celebration, and their faces glowed with either fear or joy. If they were fleeing from danger, there was no sign of it, and the group split and flew north and south. In the flicker of a moment they had disappeared.

Now three men stepped from the mosque, holding what looked like wooden sticks. One wore a blue shirt, one a black shirt, and one a white shirt. They shouted and smiled, which gave their faces a buoyant quality. Their tiny rally seemed brash: Did they not see the Chinese police on every corner or hear the amplified news about manifest happiness?

They turned southward. All three walked with peculiar long strides and waved their sticks overhead, like three baton-twirling drum majors whose marching band had run ahead of them. They passed rows of market stalls where people shouted to them to stop whatever they were doing. Shop owners slammed shut their stall doors. After two blocks the men stopped and turned back north; just before they reached me, they crossed the street. They still held up what were, more likely, rusted swords.
他们转身向南走去。三个人都迈着异乎寻常的大步并将他们的棍棒举过头顶,高高地晃着,就好像是三个挥舞鼓棒的鼓手在指挥着跑在他们前面的乐队。他们穿过市 集,很多人对着他们大声吼叫,试图阻止他们,无论他们想做什么。店主们将他们的商铺怦的关上。走过两个街区以后,这三个男人停了下来又转身向北折回;他们 穿过一条马路,马上就要和我相遇。他们还紧握着手里那东西,看起来更像是一把把锈刀。

Once across the street, they burst into a run, heading toward a group of armed Chinese. The man in blue sprinted ahead; he seemed to catch the government forces off guard, because they turned and ran. The details of the next moment—the angle of the running man, his shirt billowing behind him, the strange coolness of the air—were etched by a sound: a gunshot. But the three Uygurs did not stop in the face of destruction. They tilted toward it.
一穿过马路,他们就突然跑了起来,冲向了一群中国武装人员。穿蓝衣服的人在前;但他似乎并没有引起政府部队的主义,因为他们转身跑开了。让我们来看看接下 来发生了什么:那个怒气冲冲的男人跑得衣服都飘了起来,突然枪声响起,随后空气中凝固着一股奇怪的死寂。但是这三个维吾尔人并没有因为面对死神威胁而停步 不前。他们视死如归。

The Tibetan struggle for independence from China has long captivated the West. Fewer people are familiar with an arguably more critical struggle in a neighboring hinterland: that of the Uygurs. Their anonymity is ironic because the West has played an unwitting role in their current crisis—and because the Uygurs, whose culture is fading toward obscurity, once occupied the center of the known world.

Xinjiang sits in the middle of Asia, encircled by some of Earth’s highest mountains, as though a drawstring had cinched the top of the world like a coin purse. Passes through those snowy mountains funneled ancient traders and travelers along paths that became the renowned Silk Road. “They say it is the highest place in the world,” Marco Polo wrote of climbing the Pamir mountains from the Afghanistan side. When he emerged from the pass, he found the Uygur homeland and marveled: “From this country, many merchants go forth about the world.”
新疆位于亚洲中部,被世界上最高的一些山峦围绕,就像是一根细线把世界制高地围系成一个小钱包一样。穿越过那些雪山,商人和旅者在著名的丝绸之路上汇集到 了一起。“他们说这里是世界最高之处,”当马可波罗从阿富汗境内一侧爬上帕尔马山峰时如是写道。当他出现在丝绸之路上时,他发现了维吾尔族人的家园并啧啧称奇道:“很多商人从这个国家走出去开始了解世界。”

The territory became the fulcrum on which Asia and Europe balanced. Turkic raiders and later Genghis Khan, Buddhists and then Muslims, traders and tribesmen, missionaries and monks—all passed through this hemispheric crossroads, and each group left something of itself. I saw a Uygur woman wearing a Muslim head cover and holding her baby, whose head she had shaved into phantasmagoric designs, a pre-Islamic shamanistic practice to frighten away baby-stealing evil spirits. Xin jiang’s history is also written in the faces of its people: dark faces with oval eyes. Also fair faces with narrow, jet eyes. And sometimes blue eyes with blond hair.
这片土地成了亚洲和欧洲的制衡点。突厥入侵者和后来的成吉思汗,佛陀和穆斯林教徒,商人和部落游民,传教士和僧侣——都在经过这东西半球的十字路口时留下 了自己的足迹。我看到一个维族妇女怀抱着孩子,穿戴的是穆斯林头饰,但这个头饰被剪裁得十分诡异,是伊斯兰教前身萨满祭祀的打扮,用来吓跑那些偷拐儿童的 恶灵。新疆的历史也同样写在了他子民的脸上:黝黑的脸上椭圆形的眼睛。也有扁平的脸上细细的乌黑的眼睛。有时又是蓝眼金发。

Raising her voice, a Han teacher calls out the correct answer in Chinese at a Uygur high school. Despite an official bilingual policy, the Uygur language is disappearing from classrooms. Some Uygur parents want their children to learn Chinese as a way to get ahead, but many decry the stifling of language and identity.


From National Geographic

Geography itself protects the mosaic of Uygur culture in Hotan, in far southwestern Xinjiang. A range of snowcapped mountains rises at the town’s back, and before it lies the Taklimakan, a desert larger than Poland, which people sometimes call the Sea of Death. Hotan’s inhabitants are mostly farmers, and many of them come together each Sunday outside the town for a bazaar where children eat sweetened ice shaved from chunks that float down the Karakax (Black Jade) River, women browse tents full of silk, and men gather to have their beards trimmed while they tell jokes.

It’s an old scene, although there is an occasional sign of technology: Knifemakers sit in long rows on ancient bicycles they’ve reconfigured to spin grindstones, looking like an invading horde of spark-spitting cyclists. A young Uygur man named Otkur (the names of Uygurs in Xinjiang have been changed for their protection) shared his bowl of sheep’s lung with me, and afterward we approached an astonishing device: a two-story-high swing set with a seat big enough for two people to stand on. Otkur smiled. “For playing,” he said. Two women climbed onto the ends of the seat and swung so high they disappeared into tree branches.
这可是一副过往生活的场面,尽管其中偶然会出现一个科学技术的代表标志:制刀工匠们在经过改造老旧自行车上坐成一排,转动磨刀石,他们这样看上去就像是一 群喷着火花,汹涌袭来的“车手”部落。一个名叫Otkur(为了保护他们,文中的维族姓名都做了改变)维族年轻人和我分享了他碗中的羊肺,然后我们一起来 到一个器械前,令人惊讶不已的是:这是一个两层楼高的秋千,装有足以两人站立的座椅。Otkur笑了。“随便玩玩的,”他说。两个妇女爬上了椅子玩荡秋 千,她们荡得太高了,消失在了树干之中。

In town I met Dawud, a music master who teaches a small group of students. In his school a large mural showed a mashrap, a traditional all-male gathering—now closely regulated by the Chinese—where Uygurs convene to play music, recite poetry, and socialize. Dawud fashioned a fingerpick from a piece of wire and some twine, flicked his fingers across the five strings of a tambur, and launched into a series of complex songs with roots that reach back at least five centuries.
在城里我遇到了Dawud,一个音乐教师,教授着一小群学生。在他的学校里一块大墙壁上画着一场mashrap,一种传统的男性集会,集会会有音乐表演, 诗词朗诵和一些社交活动,现在这一形式已被中国严格监控。Dawud很时髦地带着一个金属丝和细线做成的弦拨,他用手指轻弹不拉琴,很快一首首精妙的歌曲 响起,这些歌曲至少可以追溯到5个世纪前。

Those patchwork elements of Uygur life underscore something crucial about the Uygurs as a whole: Centuries of living at a great Eurasian way station have made them a complicated people who defy careless classification. But in time the world forgot this, with disastrous results.

As the Silk Road began to fray and trade took to the seas, both East and West lost interest in the Uygurs and their mountain fastness. For generations China saw little promise in this remote land—Xinjiang means “new frontier”—because the Chinese prized agriculture, and the wild west offered only dust and stones. People there ate mutton, not pork. In 1932 a British officer traveling in Xinjiang wrote with dark foresight, “Perhaps an awakening China, wondering where to settle its surplus millions of people, may have the good sense to call in the science of the West and to develop [Xinjiang].” But through the early 20th century, the Chinese government did not extend its influence to the distant region, and the Uygurs twice declared their own independent country. The second attempt at self-determination, in 1944, lasted five years, until the rise of Mao and the Chinese Communist Party, which sent in military forces and later established a nuclear testing ground, Lop Nur, in Xinjiang to eliminate any confusion.
当交易越来越多地转向海上,丝绸之路也式渐衰微,东方和西方都对维吾尔族和他们的山中城堡失去了兴趣。新疆在几代中国人眼里都是边陲蛮荒之地,这是因为 中国人更看重农业,而这西部荒野除了尘土和乱石什么都没有。人们在这里只吃羊肉而不吃猪肉。1932年英国官员在考察完新疆后卓有远见地写到:“正在苏醒 过来的中国也许正在考虑在哪里安置数以百万计的富裕人口,他应该能敏锐的感觉到从西方社会引入科学技术,大力开发新疆,将是解决这个问题的好办法。”但是中国 在20世纪早期并没有扩大自己在这遥远西部的影响力,而维吾尔族人却两次宣布独立。在1944年,他们又一次尝试独立,持续了五年,直到毛氏政权和中国共产党的崛起。军队被派驻了进来,随后又建立起了罗布泊核弹试验基地,藉此树立威信。

Realizing that, if nothing else, its big, empty territory provided a buffer against foreign influence, Mao’s China instituted a program called the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps—combining farm, military garrison, and prison—in which settlers from other Chinese provinces would work the soil and watch the borders. The first arrivals, in 1954, included more than 100,000 demobilized soldiers. Some were coerced, but the flow gathered momentum as the government extended a railroad west to Urumqi in 1962 and used promises of food and clothing to entice residents from overcrowded cities like Shanghai.
毛泽东时期的中国政权觉得这里除了广袤无边的荒地外一无所有,但这里可以有效的防止外国势力的影响和渗入,于是他们计划建立起新疆生产建设兵团:将农田、 卫戍部队和监狱归并到一起,让来自中国各地的人们在其中居住,同时开垦荒地和驻守边防。1954年第一批人来到这里,其中还有100,000名残疾军人。 政府在1962年将铁路通到了乌鲁木齐并承诺提供食品和衣物以吸引像上海这样人口密集的城市的居民前往,很多人也正因为这样的原因来到了新疆,但其中也有一部分人是被强行带来的。

Surveillance cameras at a new Uygur housing project in Kashgar reinforce Chinese control.


From National Geographic

Meanwhile the Chinese were discovering that Xinjiang offered far more than just a border cushion: It held something vital to their very survival as a nation. Xinjiang contains about 40 percent of China’s coal reserves and more than a fifth of its natural gas. Most important, it has nearly a fifth of the nation’s proven oil reserves, although Beijing claims it holds as much as a third. Never mind the massive deposits of gold, salt, and other minerals. Xinjiang isn’t empty. It’s strategic. And with that realization, other things came sharply into focus for China’s leadership: Xinjiang is the largest, most far-flung region. It borders more countries than any other. And it’s home to an ethnic group that has tried twice in living memory to make a break for freedom.

Demolition erases another block of Kashgar’s Old City, center of Uygur life in the historic oasis town. Claiming that the long-standing mud-brick structures are unsafe, officials clear space for high-rises.


From National Geographic
Where merchants once trekked through western China on the Silk Road, today pipelines, highways, and railroads serve as conduits of wealth. In recent years Xinjiang (“new frontier”) has attracted a flood of Han Chinese, with many going to new town sites like Alar on the desert rim. Uygurs still dominate the rural south, but the north looks increasingly like the rest of booming China.


From National Geographic
Distinctly Uygur, the Sunday bazaar in Layka teems with shoppers in colorful scarves and embroidered caps. Here livestock sales, the hawking of crafts, and matchmaking schemes unfold as in generations past.


From National Geographic

In 1947, during the second incarnation of Uygur independence, about 220,000 Han Chinese made up 5 percent of Xinjiang’s population. Uygurs numbered about three million, or 75 percent, the remainder being a mix of Central Asian ethnicities. By 2007 the Uygur population had increased to 9.6 million. But the Han population had swelled to 8.2 million.

Some Uygurs found opportunity in the influx. In the 1980s in burgeoning Urumqi, a laundress named Rebiya Kadeer grew her business into a department store, then built that into an international trading empire. She became one of the wealthiest people in China and an inspiration for her compatriots—a Uygur woman who appeared in Asia’s Wall Street Journal and met with such businessmen as Bill Gates and Warren Buffett. In many ways she seemed emblematic of Xinjiang: In the last two decades of the 20th century the region’s GDP increased tenfold.
有些维吾尔人将这种大融合视作机遇。在80年代,发展正处于上升期的乌鲁木齐,一个名叫热比娅·卡德尔的洗衣女工将她的事业渐渐发展成了一家百货公司,随后又将其建成为一个国际贸易帝国。热比娅·卡德尔——一个维族妇女,登上了亚洲华尔街日报并和商业大亨比尔·盖茨和沃伦·巴菲特会面。她成了中国最富有的 人,同时也成为了她的同胞引以为豪的榜样。

Daybreak in the village of Darya Boyi finds a daughter doing chores. Brightly draped wooden platforms serve as beds, and a future meal of mutton hangs from a hook. Uygur activists complain that government programs pressure young women in villages to move east to work in factories.

一个女孩在Darya Boyi的小村庄里打零工,现在正是休息的间隙。铺着颜色亮丽布料的木质板被当作床用,一块羊肉用钩子吊在半空中。维族激进分子抱怨说政府的种种举措使得村子里年轻的妇女倍感压力,不得不去东部的工厂里打工。

From National Geographic
Following tradition in the city, women in Kashgar take home gifts of flatbread after a wedding.


From National Geographic

But many more Uygurs languished. The big business in Xinjiang is oil, but all that oil is controlled from Beijing by state-owned energy companies. Many of the good jobs in Xinjiang are government jobs, and employees can advance more readily if they join the Communist Party, which requires renouncing their religion. And most Uygurs won’t do that. The result is an ironic and combustible symmetry: As Han settlers pour in, Uygurs, unable to find work in their fantastically wealthy and spacious homeland, migrate east to work in privately owned factories in crowded coastal cities.

In the past few decades local resistance has flared up around Xinjiang, fluctuating in scale and violence. During the 1980s Uygur students protested treatment by police in a handful of incidents; in 1990 a disturbance south of Kashgar against birth limits ended in perhaps four dozen deaths. In 1997 hundreds of people in a city called Gulja marched to protest repression of Islamic practices and were arrested; the number of casualties is unknown. Other examples abound, including bus bombings and assassinations.
在最近数十年里新疆当地的抗议活动骤然增加,形式规模和激进程度多种多样。80年代,维族学生对警察在处理一些事务时的态度表示了抗议;1990年喀什地 区居民因对计划生育而爆发骚乱,最终骚乱以大量人员伤亡而告终,外界猜测的伤亡人数为48。1997年, Gulja成百上千的人们因聚众反对对伊斯兰习俗的压迫而被捕;伤亡人数不得而知。其他的例子也是层出不穷,其中包括汽车炸弹和暗杀活动。

The Chinese government realized that it had a problem in Xinjiang, much as it had a problem in neighboring Tibet. Along with regulating mashraps—those traditional gatherings—the state monitored services at mosques, afraid they might provide a platform for dissidents. In general, officials downplayed the unrest as the work of isolated “ruffians” in a Uygur population that was otherwise blissful. In early September 2001, Xinjiang Communist Party Secretary Wang Lequan announced in Urumqi that “society is stable, and people are living and working in peace and contentment.”
中国政府于是意识到新疆问题和西藏问题一样棘手。他们担心清真寺里的各类活动会为异议人士提供平台,所以通过严格管理对传统的mashrap集会加以监 控。总的来说,官方低估了这场骚乱,他们以为只是维民中少数几个“害群之马”在兴风作浪,其他人对自己的生活现状并无怨言。2001年9月初,时任新疆党委书记王乐泉就乌鲁木齐形势发表声明称:“社会稳定,人民安居乐业。”

A few days later Beijing received a potent and unexpected propaganda tool: September 11.

As America and much of the West launched the “war on terror,” China recognized the momentum of global public opinion and chose a new tack. The shift happened so fast it came with an almost audible crack. On October 11 a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry described China as “a victim of international terrorism.” Then the government issued a report on unrest in Xinjiang blaming none other than Osama bin Laden. “It’s an effective strategy,” says James Millward, a professor at Georgetown University and an expert on Xinjiang, “because in America we see Muslims somewhere who are unhappy and maybe even violent, and we assume it’s because of religious reasons.”
美国和其他西方国家启动“反恐战争”后,中国方面意识到了全球人民的反恐意愿,于是选定了一条新的行动路线。这一转变令人始料不及,一时间人们议论纷纷。10月11日中国外交部发言人称中国“饱受国际恐怖主义摧残”。随后政府发布公告,将新疆的混乱局面归罪于奥萨马·本·拉登。“这是个行之有效的策略,”乔治敦大学教授兼新疆问题专家James Millward如是说,“因为在美国,我们看到有些地方的穆斯林们看上去很苦闷甚至可能有暴力倾向,所以我们就认为这可能是宗教原因导致的。”

And just like that, the Uygurs—with the complexity of their culture, the richness of their past, the fullness of their grievance against the Chinese state—fell into a tidy classification. China asked the United States to include a group of militant separatist Uygurs on its list of terrorist organizations but was rebuffed—at least at first.

In December 2001, 22 Uygurs were captured in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where they may have received weapons training with the intent of battling the Chinese military back in Xin jiang. The men were rounded up by bounty hunters, handed over to U.S. forces, and sent to Guantánamo Bay. (Years later a U.S. court would order their release.) In August 2002 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage traveled to Beijing to discuss, among other issues, America’s upcoming mission in Iraq. While there, he announced a reversal in the U.S. stance: A militant Uygur group called the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement would now be listed as a terrorist organization.
2001年12月,22名维族武装分子在巴基斯坦和阿富汗被捕,他们在那些地方接受了军事训练,目的是回到新疆后和中国军队作战。这些由赏金猎人组成的武 装人员被移交给了美国,并被押往关塔那摩监狱。(几年后美国法院宣布释放他们。)2002年8月,美国副国务卿Richard Armitage访问北京,而美国即将在伊拉克展开的军事行动也是其中的话题之一。在北京,Richard Armitage改变了美国先前的对华姿态,宣称将军事武装力量——东突伊斯兰运动组织列为恐怖组织。

Near Hotan, gamblers crowd around after a dogfight—a sharp contrast to the folk dances and wrestling matches Uygurs perform for tourists. In rural areas especially, men and women tend to socialize separately.


From National Geographic
Idling at a night market in Kashgar, a motorcycle taxi driver waits for his next fare. Limited job opportunities tend to stall many Uygurs as the gap widens between haves and have-nots. According to a U.S. government report, in a recent recruiting effort the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps reserved some 800 of its 840 civil service job openings for Han workers.


From National Geographic
Unbowed by a sandstorm, pilgrims pray at the graves of Islamic saints during the Imam Asim festival near Hotan. Chinese officials restrict activities at mosques but so far have tolerated rural religious gatherings.

朝圣者Imam Asim节那天在和田附近的伊斯兰圣墓地前进行祷告,即使遭遇沙尘暴他们也不为所动。中国官方对清真寺内的各类活动重重限制,但目前为止他们对农村的宗教集会还是容忍的。

From National Geographic

The heart of Uygur tradition is the ancient capital of Kashgar. Today its Old City looks much as it must have when Marco Polo spied it after descending through the mountain pass—a warren of passageways and ancient mud-brick homes that resemble a jumble of oversize children’s blocks. Early this year the Chinese government undertook a bold step: They began systematically bulldozing the Old City block by block and moving the inhabitants into a new compound on the edge of town.

Uygurs don’t discuss the subject in public for fear of imprisonment, but one man who lives in the Old City, Ahun, agreed to talk with me in his home. A rendezvous would not be easy, because for days the Chinese security services had been following me. I was to wait in the main square during the busy midday until I saw him pass under Mao’s statue, then follow at a distance without acknowledgment.
维族人不敢公开讨论这个话题,因为害怕会被捕入狱,但是一个名叫Ahun的人同意带我去他家谈这个问题,他就住在老城里。但碰头地点可不那么好选,因为这 几天来中国秘密警察们一直在跟踪我。热闹的中午时分,我站在广场上等着,直到我看见他从毛泽东像下经过,然后我在无人察觉的情况下很快地跟了上去。

As we walked through city streets, he stopped casually to take a drink of water at a cart and later to tie his shoe. Finally we entered the Old City. The Chinese government’s ostensible reason for demolishing the neighborhood is that it’s too old to withstand an earthquake. But there may be another motive. As Ahun and I wove our way deeper into the warren, I watched his shoulders relax and his gait loosen. He was hard to trace in here. The Old City is a refuge.
当我们穿梭在城市的街道上时,他小心翼翼地停下来在小摊上买了瓶水喝,后来又绑了绑鞋带。最后我们进到了古城。中国政府将此地夷平的理由是房屋陈旧,无法 抵抗地震。但这只是表面上说辞,或许他们还有其他的目的。当我们越来越深入到这个大庄院,我看他放下了紧耸的双肩,脚步也放慢了下来。在这里他就没那么容 易被抓到了。这片老城区就像是一个避难所。

The homes are adjacent and interconnected, and each is two stories high and arranged around a central courtyard. I followed Ahun up a flight of stairs, and when he flung open the door, it struck me that these homes are like oysters: On the outside they’re drab and crude, but on the inside whitewashed plaster walls gleam, and many-colored rugs complement painted ceilings. “I pray. When I worship, I ask Allah, ‘Rescue me my house,'” Ahun said. From his house he has a clear view of a government wrecking crew at work on a nearby home. According to the demolition schedule, they’ll arrive at Ahun’s home in three years.
这里一幢幢房屋都交织在一起,相互紧邻,每幢房子都有两层楼高,中间围着个园子。我跟着Ahun走上一段楼梯后他推开了门,我当时就震惊了,这些屋子就像 贝壳一样:外面看起来单调乏味,但是里面却别有洞天,白色石膏刷过的墙面闪着微光,色彩绚丽的毛毯和画满图案的天花板搭配得相得益彰。”我在做礼拜时向阿拉祷告,‘救救我的屋子,’“Ahun说。从他的屋子里望出去,政府拆迁部门在附近的作业被看得清清楚楚。根据拆迁计划,他们将在三年内拆除Ahun的房 屋。

He was born in the house, he said. So was his father. So was his grandfather, after his great-grandfather built it on family land. “I have two sons,” he said. That’s five generations who have lived in the same house.

If Hotan represents Xinjiang’s past—with a Uygur majority that gathers to sharpen knives, trim beards, sing songs—then Kashgar is its present. Uygurs still make up most of the city’s population, but their culture here is embattled. The government is working fast to tear it down.

Given enough time, Ahun said, China’s economic development will bring political change, and hope for his people. “China will be obliged to receive a democratic system,” he said. But right now, for a man who prays each day for the survival of his family home, no act is too desperate. “You do not understand our rage,” he said. “In the Middle East there are human bombs, who connect their bodies with bombs. But with our rage, we don’t need bombs connected. We ourselves explode.”
Ahun说。随着时间的推移,中国经济的持续发展将最终将会为他的人民带来一场政治变革和一丝希望的曙光。“中国将被迫接受民主政治模式,”他说。但是此 时此刻,对于一个为了保住自己房产而每天祈求的男人来说,不拿出点实际行动来,一切只能陷入无尽的绝望中。“你不知道我们有多么愤怒,”他说。“在中东有 人体炸弹,他们将自己和炸弹绑在一起。但我们不需要炸弹,我们的怒气直接就能把我们气炸了。”

In June of this year, a disgruntled worker at a toy factory in Shaoguan, near Hong Kong, reportedly claimed that Uygurs had raped two women. A melee followed. The violence lasted several hours and left scores injured. Angry Han workers in the factory’s dormitory beat to death two Uygur co-workers.

This spark lit a fire 2,000 miles away, in Xin jiang. On July 5 thousands of Uygurs—the numbers reported varied widely—took to Urumqi’s streets to protest the treatment of the Uygur workers. The authorities were caught off guard.

I spoke to a young woman named Arzigul, who had attended the protest. She said it started off peacefully as young people circulated around the capital’s public square. “They were screaming the name ‘Uygur! Uygur! Uygur!'” she said. When security forces arrived, something happened—exactly what is unclear. Each side says the other struck first, but at some point the authorities tried to quell the crowd, which apparently devolved into a mob attacking Han on the street. Two days later a group of Han—apparently numbering in the thousands—took to the street with meat cleavers and clubs and knives. They in turn attacked Uygurs.
我和一个参加过抗议活动的年轻妇女交谈过,她叫Arzigul。她说刚开始年轻人渐渐聚拢到首府的广场上,一切都显得很有秩序。“他们高呼自己的族名‘维 吾尔!维吾尔!维吾尔!’”她说。当安全部队到达后,发生了一些事,具体情况不是很清楚。反正双方各执一词,都坚称是对方先动的手,不过某些迹象表明,官 方试图去驱赶人群,很明显,结果最终演变为一群暴徒在大街上大肆攻击汉族人。两天后一群手持砍刀,棍棒和匕首的汉族人走上街头,人数显然超过了 1,000。他们开始报复维吾尔族人先前的攻击。

Chinese officials say they’re protecting their citizens from terrorists. In July, Vice Foreign Minister He Yafei called the riots “a grave and violent criminal incident plotted and organized by the outside forces of terrorism, separatism, no comma after separatism in original source and extremism.” James Millward, the Xinjiang expert, says many Han—even officials—sincerely believe Xinjiang faces a threat from terrorists and interlopers. “It’s what they are constantly told.” Eventually military forces and police clamped down on Urumqi, and there seemed no possibility of further unrest. That’s when the three men emerged from the mosque in the Uygur quarter, scattering people in every direction.
中国官方称他们在保护自己的公民免受恐怖分子的侵害。7月外交部副部长何亚非将这场暴乱称作是“一场由境外恐怖分子,分裂分子和激进分子联手策划组织的一 起重大暴力犯罪事件。”新疆问题专家James Millward说,很多汉族人,甚至是官员,都真的相信新疆面临恐怖分子和敌对分子的威胁。“这是他们一贯的宣传口径。”最后,部队和警察进驻乌鲁木齐 实行戒严,看起来骚乱不可能在这里进一步升级了。但我们前文中提到的三个维吾尔人正是在这个时候出现在了乌鲁木齐清真寺的一角,把人们吓得四散逃窜。

I watched them stride up the street and back, then run at the Chinese forces. First came the single shot, which missed. The Uygurs continued their charge, and I realized that the running men with their rusted swords did not expect to prevail. They expected to die.

A moment later another officer released a burst of automatic fire. The lead Uygur—the man in the flowing blue shirt—fell with the sudden slackness of a thrown rag doll. His body hit the pavement, but the momentum of his sprint sent him tumbling, and his feet flew up and over his head.

For a few seconds the incident played out in tableau on the opposite sidewalk. The remaining two Uygurs ran into the street, and the scene became three-dimensional, with bullets flying in my direction. I ran into a nearby building and found myself in the lobby of an enormous department store. People pressed themselves into corners and behind clothing displays; women wailed, and two men improvised a door lock by shoving a metal bar through the door’s handles. Beyond the building’s glass doors, all three of the Uygur men now lay in the street, one injured and two dead. Soldiers, police, and plainclothes security officers were firing upward, into the windows of surrounding buildings.
几秒钟后,剩下的两个维族人回过神来,冲到街上。刚才对面人行道上肃然静止的画面也因为子弹飞梭而又活跃了起来。因为不时有子弹向我飞来,我跑进了附近一 幢建筑物,进来后我发现自己身处在一个大型百货公司的大厅里。人们或是蜷缩在角落,或是躲在衣架后;妇女们在哭泣,两个男人随手将一根金属棒塞进门把,算是把门锁上。玻璃大门外,三个维族人都倒在了地上,两死一伤。士兵,警察和便衣的国保官员朝天鸣枪,子弹射入了周边建筑的玻璃窗里。

The department store held special significance for the Uygurs. It belonged to their heroine Rebiya Kadeer, the laundress turned mogul who had become beloved after she began to speak out against China’s treatment of the Uygurs. In 1999, as an American delegation arrived in China to meet Kadeer, security officers arrested her. She spent the next six years in prison, then joined her exiled husband in the U.S. Her imprisonment only raised her status among her people, who regard her as the “mother of all Uygurs.”
这幢百货大楼对维民来讲有着特殊的意义。它属于他们的女英雄——热比娅·卡德尔,她从一个默默无闻的洗衣女工转变为声名远播的显赫人物,她因为公开谴责中 国的维民政策而备受爱戴。1999年,美国大使团来到中国会见了卡德尔,国保官员随后就逮捕了她。她入狱六年后和她流亡的丈夫在美国重逢。她的牢狱之灾反而提升了她在维民心目中的地位,维民们视她为“维吾尔族人的母亲。”

She’s a grandmother, just over five feet tall, and she terrifies the Chinese authorities. Mentioning her name in Xinjiang brings swift and severe punishment. When I went with Ahun to his home in Kashgar’s Old City, he spoke freely of rebellion against China’s government, but when I mentioned Rebiya Kadeer, he froze. “If China finds this,” he said, pointing to my voice recorder and then reaching for my throat in mock vengeance, “on Judgment Day I will catch your neck.”
她是一个身高仅5尺的祖母级人物,但她却让中国政府寝食难安。在新疆,只要提及她的名字就可能马上会受到严厉的惩罚。当我在喀什老城的Ahun家 时,Ahun对针对中国政府的反叛活动谈得毫无避讳,但当我提到了热比娅·卡德尔时,他就僵住了。“如果中国政府找到这个,”他指了指我的录音设备,又指 了指我的脖子,故作凶狠地说,“在审判日那天,我不会放过你的。”

After the July riots, trucks with loudspeakers circled the public squares of Urumqi, proclaiming that the unrest had been organized by Kadeer from her office in Washington, D.C. Chinese officials accused her in news reports around the globe and were said to be planning to tear down her trade centers. “The Chinese authorities are fearful of me because of what they have been doing to the Uygur people,” she told me recently. In her office an enormous East Turkistan flag—symbol of a free Uygur nation—hangs on one wall, and photos of her 11 children, two of whom are in prison, hang on another.
七月的骚乱过去以后,装有大喇叭的卡车绕着乌鲁木齐广场不停地广播宣传,声称这次骚乱是由卡德尔在她华盛顿特区的办公室里远程组织指挥的。中国官方在全球 的新闻报道中谴责了她的行径,并称正计划推倒她的商业中心。“中国政府害怕我是因为他们对维吾尔人的所作所为,”她最近告诉我。在她办公室里,象征维吾尔独立的大幅东突厥斯坦旗挂在一面墙上,而另一面墙上挂着她11个儿子的集体照,其中两个还在监狱里。

The Western world knows of the struggle for freedom by Tibetans largely because the Dalai Lama presents a warm and charismatic embodiment of his people. The Uygurs have remained obscure, in part, because they have no such figure. But the Chinese government’s recent efforts to demonize Rebiya Kadeer have lifted her into a representative role. “I keep advocating for my people, for the self-determination of Uygurs,” she told me. Whether that means autonomy within China or a push for full independence depends on the government’s reaction, she said. “At the moment I’m trying to invite the Chinese authorities to come to the dialogue peacefully.”
西方世界很清楚西藏在争取独立自由方面作的努力,这很大程度上要归功于达赖喇嘛,他热情、充满人格魅力的形象成了西藏人民最好的代言。但维吾尔族人处境却几乎不为人知,某些方面是因为他们缺乏这样一个代表人物。但最近中国政府试图妖魔化热比娅·卡德尔的努力反而促使她成为了这样的一个代表人物。“我矢志不渝地为我的人民,为维吾尔人自己的诉求而呐喊发声,” 她曾对我这样说过。她还说,无论这意味着在中国范围内实现自治还是完全从中国独立出取决于中国政府的回应。“此时此刻,我想邀请中国领导人坐下来进行一次 和平的对话。”

Even as Kadeer spoke, another round of strife loomed in Xinjiang—rumors, allegations, protests—and she acknowledges that a peaceful resolution may be impossible. After seeing the region’s past and present through Hotan and Kashgar, we may be glimpsing its future in Urumqi: a sprawling city that serves Han migrants drawn by Xinjiang’s natural resources, where a Uygur minority stays confined to its quarter.
而当卡德尔说完这番话后,新疆又一轮骚动喷薄欲出——各种谣言,论调,抗议层出不穷——她知道和平解决争端或已成为了不可能。从新疆的和田和喀什,我们看 到了这个地区的过去和现在,借此我们或许可以瞥见乌鲁木齐的未来:一个为汉族人汲取新疆天然资源的大城市,但少数派的维吾尔人却处处受限。

And on an otherwise silent Monday afternoon, men detonate on the street from the sheer force of their rage.

A Uygur disco in Hotan attracts young couples to a nightlife of their own. The scene belies the official Chinese portrait of Uygurs as “colorful, quaint folks,” says China scholar James Millward. “In the cities they are modern and worldly.” Many Uygurs also fight the separatist label. But unless more of Xinjiang’s wealth is shared and their culture is respected, more Uygurs will demand change.

一家位于和田的迪斯科舞厅吸引年轻的情侣们,他们有自己的夜生活。这幅场景和中国官方形容的维吾尔族是“独特传统的民族”不大一样,中国学者James Millward说。“在城市里他们很现代,也很与时俱进。”很多维吾尔人也都极力想撕掉分裂分子的标签。但是如果新疆的财富分配仍然不公,文化也不被予以尊重,会更多的维吾尔人要求改变。

From National Geographic
Alike in dress and devotion, sisters use the traditional mourning day of Thursday to visit the grave of a family member near their village.


From National Geographic
In Kashgar’s Old City a child stares at the grown-up work of slaughtering an animal for a wedding feast.


From National Geographic
Surrounded by furnishings worthy of a Silk Road trader, the father of an antiques dealer takes tea in his home in Kashgar’s historic center.


From National Geographic
Religious traffic moves through the Taklimakan Desert in May during the Imam Asim festival. Uygurs from across Xinjiang walk a path that ends at the mazar, or shrine, of an 11th-century Islamic martyr who died fighting Buddhist forces, according to legend.

宗教队伍在五月的Imam Asim节里穿过塔克拉玛干大沙漠。新疆各地的维吾尔人都会走到mazar墓,或者说是圣殿,根据传说,11世纪这位伊斯兰英雄在这里和佛教势力死斗,最后英勇献身。

From National Geographic
Incongruous Chinese-themed posters decorate a Uygur barbershop.


From National Geographic
Many hands help make samsa—mutton pies—in the kitchen of a family restaurant in Layka. The stuffed dough will cook inside a traditional clay oven. A major difference between Chinese and Uygur cuisine: Han Chinese love pork, while Uygurs, most of whom are Sunni Muslims, do not eat it.

在Layka,一个小家庭经营的旅店厨房里,很多人在帮忙做 samsa——一种羊肉饼。这塞满东西的面团要放到一种传统的容器里去烧。和中式的做法不同:汉人喜欢吃猪肉,而大部分维吾尔人是逊尼派穆斯林人,他们不吃猪肉。

From National Geographic
Potential buyers check the merchandise at the Kashgar livestock market. Explorer Marco Polo, traveling the Silk Road, stopped at the Kashgar oasis in the 1270s. From here, he wrote, “many merchants go forth about the world on trading journeys.”


From National Geographic
Keeping to the gender roles defined by rural Uygur society, a wife manages the cooking and tends to a child, while her husband, a local official (at right), conducts business with an elderly villager.


From National Geographic
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps

7 thoughts on “(译文)The Other Tibet

Leave a Reply to T Cancel reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

You may use these HTML tags and attributes: <a href="" title=""> <abbr title=""> <acronym title=""> <b> <blockquote cite=""> <cite> <code> <del datetime=""> <em> <i> <q cite=""> <strike> <strong>